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The Shrinkwrap Snafu: Untangling the
“Extra Element” in Breach of Contract Claims
Based on Shrinkwrap Licenses
I. INTRODUCTION
In the midst of the software boom, and with so much at stake,
computer software developers scrambled to protect their products from
blatant copying and unscrupulous takeoffs. Ultimately, they responded
by imposing restrictive licenses (shrinkwrap licenses1) upon everyone
who would purchase and use their computer software. The enforcement
of these licenses has fueled a great debate. Courts and commentators
alike have questioned whether these licenses strip federally granted
rights from the public and bestow these rights upon software developers.
Courts have yet to reach a consensus on whether shrinkwrap licenses,
backed by state contract law, should be preempted by federal copyright
law.
However, an analysis of § 301 of the Copyright Act,2 read in light of
the purposes of copyright law, shows that breach of contract claims
based on shrinkwrap licenses should be preempted by copyright law.
Courts denying preemption under § 301 distinguished copyright claims
from contract claims by applying the “extra element” test.3 Under this
1. Software developers created “shrinkwrap” and “clickwrap” licenses in order to bind
software users to nonnegotiable, strict terms of usage. Shrinkwrap licenses are printed on the plastic
wrappers of computer software and opening the wrapper is considered assent to the contractual
terms. Clickwrap licenses are disclosed during setup of computer software, and a user cannot
complete installation of the software unless she agrees to the contractual terms. For purposes of this
Comment, shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses will be collectively referred to as “shrinkwrap”
licenses.
Shrinkwrap licenses contain restrictions prohibiting the consumer from translating,
decompiling, disassembling, or making backup copies of computer software, music, videos, or
DVDs; also, the consumer may be prohibited from making the software compatible with other
programs.
2. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). Section 301 of the Copyright Act endows copyright law with
power to preempt any other legal right that is equivalent to a right granted under copyright law. See
infra Part III.A for an analysis of § 301.
3. The “extra element” test originated in the copyright arena in order to determine whether a
right lies within the general scope of copyright law. If so, that right is preempted by § 301 of the
Copyright Act. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 787 (5th Cir. 1999). For a
discussion of the extra element test, see infra Part III.A.
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test, a contract claim is not equivalent to (and thus not preempted by) a
copyright claim if the contract claim requires the accuser to prove
additional elements superfluous to the copyright claim. Courts have
found that shrinkwrap licenses are not preempted by improperly
distinguishing the contract claim with the extra element of bargain—an
element that is not present in shrinkwrap licenses because the consumer
has no option but to accept the license or return the software to the
developer. Preemption of shrinkwrap licenses is also proper because it
does not leave software developers unprotected. Under the current test
for fair use found in § 107 of the Copyright Act,4 the economic interests
of computer developers can be respected while allowing the public fair
use of digital materials (digital fair use5). Further, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act6 (DMCA) serves the interests of software developers by
prohibiting the circumvention of technological measures that developers
chose to employ in protecting their software.7
Precluding preemption of breach of contract claims based on
shrinkwrap licenses presents significant problems. The copyright
doctrine of fair use—which permits consumers to freely use copyrighted
materials for limited personal, noncommercial purposes such as archival
copying, developing interoperability, or modifying computer programs—
will be eviscerated if copyright law wields no preemptive power over
breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses. This problem
arises because while fair uses cannot constitute copyright infringement,
these same uses are not insulated against breach of contract claims.8
Therefore, even though a particular use of copyrighted software is a fair
use, this public right will not be a valid defense to a breach of contract

4. The doctrine of fair use protects the public’s right to freely use copyrighted materials “for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.” 17
U.S.C. § 107. For example, a book critic is protected by the doctrine of fair use when she copies
important passages from the book as part of her critique. Without the fair use doctrine, the author of
the book would be able to hold the critic liable for copyright infringement and thereby suppress
possibly negative critiques of the book.
5. It should be noted that the author uses “digital fair use” to refer only to the fair use of
digital materials. These materials principally include computer software, which may be protected
through encryption or some other means or may require the user to enter into a licensing agreement
before installation or use.
6. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.), available at http://frwebgate.access. gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_bills&docid=f:h2281enr.txt.pdf (last visited October 28, 2003).
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
8. See id.
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claim.9 Thus, allowing breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap
licenses sets at naught the fair use doctrine and the purposes of Congress.
By weighing the practical effects of the shrinkwrap licensing provisions
against the purposes of copyright law, courts should be moved to
invalidate such provisions.
This Comment begins by introducing the foundational principles of
copyright law, including the copyright infringement standard, digital fair
use, and reverse engineering, a category of fair use. Part II discusses
several reasons why software developers may have been displeased with
the protection available to them under copyright law, as well as the
consequent advent of shrinkwrap licenses. Part III analyzes the
shrinkwrap licenses under § 301 of the Copyright Act, concluding that
breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses should be
preempted by copyright law because these claims are substantively
equivalent to copyright claims. Although some courts have distinguished
breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses from copyright
claims using the extra element test, these courts have inappropriately
relied on the element of bargain, which is not present in shrinkwrap
licenses. Part III asserts that conflict preemption is proper because
shrinkwrap licenses contravene § 107 of the Copyright Act by
eviscerating the fair use doctrine. Part IV argues that shrinkwrap licenses
are unnecessary because copyright law, tempered by the fair use
doctrine, adequately protects both the interests of the public and of the
software developers. Finally, Part V concludes that preemption is not
only proper under § 301 but is urged by the policy and goals of copyright
law.
II. BACKGROUND
Copyright law protects copyrighted works from unscrupulous
copying. Although courts and state legislatures have been very
sympathetic to copyright holders, they have also placed limitations on
the enforcement of copyrights, such as digital fair use. This limitation
has arguably translated into rights for the public.10 However, with the
boom of the computer industry in recent decades, and a lagging judicial

9. In a contract dispute involving copyrighted software, any resort to the doctrine of fair use
is unavailing because it only provides an exception to copyright infringement claims. See id. § 107.
10. See Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996).
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reaction,11 copyright law became largely ineffective in protecting
computer software.12 Consequently, software developers and lawmakers
alike sought remedies to copyright law’s alleged weaknesses through
state contract law (in the form of shrinkwrap licenses) and congressional
action.13 While these measures secured greater protection for computer
software, they also triggered a dissolution of longstanding “rights”
available to the public under the digital fair use doctrine. Part II.A
introduces fundamental copyright law principles such as copyright
infringement and digital fair use. Part II.B then discusses the climate
surrounding copyright law in recent decades, the advent of shrinkwrap
licenses, and congressional action taken to protect computer software.
A. Enforcement of a Copyright and the Fair Use Exception
With few exceptions, copyright law allows an individual to protect
her copyrighted expression from unauthorized copying. Congress created
such protection primarily to encourage the “Progress of Science.”14 The
“Progress of Science” would be impelled by granting an exclusive right,
or limited monopoly, to any individual who creates an eligible15 and
“original work[] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
11. See Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap
Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 320 n.9 (1999) (“It still remains to
be seen whether the law will develop to ‘appropriately resolve the multitude of problems posed by
the advent of computer technology.’” (quoting Thomas Finkelstein & Douglas C. Wyatt, Shrinkwrap
Licenses: Consequences of Breaking the Seal, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 839, 839 (1977))).
12. See Steven Pepe, Multimedia Computing: Copyright Law’s “Last Stand,” 12 TOURO L.
REV. 143, 144 n.8 (1995), available at http://www.tourolaw.edu/publications/lawreview/
vol12n1/pg143.html#RFn8 (last visited October 13, 2003).
13. Software developers’ decision to resort to shrinkwrap licenses evidences a reliance on
other areas of law in order to protect their interests. Additionally, the creation and encouragement of
legislation in recent years, such as the DMCA and Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA), evidences the interests of numerous groups to help the law catch up to the technological
boom. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
14. Congress was given the necessary power by the Constitution to create a law that provided
this incentive for copyright holders. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 gives Congress the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8. In 1790, Congress exercised its power and adopted the first copyright act. 1 U.S. Stat. 124
(1790). Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 suggests that copyright law is founded in an economic
rationale. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract:
Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 483 & n.15 (1995) (discussing
the changing perspective of copyright law in America from an economic-based approach to the
moralistic approach used in many foreign countries).
15. See O’Rourke, supra note 14, at 481 n.8 (enumerating the various statutory categories of
copyrightable subject matter).
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expression.”16 A copyright holder may find that enforcement of this
limited monopoly can be very lucrative.
In enforcing a copyright, courts have developed a flexible standard
which can be applied on a case-by-case basis. This standard considers the
nature of the work, the allegedly infringing actions, and any possible
defenses to the alleged copyright infringement. This section will discuss
the standard of copyright infringement and the application of digital fair
use in the infringement analysis.
1. Enforcing a copyright through an infringement claim
In order to establish a cause of action for infringement of a
copyright, a copyright holder must prove several things. First, the
copyright holder must prove that she complied with all applicable
statutory formalities and owns a valid copyright.17 Second, the copyright
holder must show that an accused infringer actually copied “constituent
elements of the work that are original.”18 However, the burden of proof
on the copyright holder may be lower than showing actual copying
because legal copying “typically may be inferred from proof of access to
the copyrighted work and ‘probative similarity.’”19
Of course, the accused infringer may try to present evidence showing
that the portion of the copyrighted work taken is not worthy of copyright
protection because it lacks originality.20 Additionally, the accused
infringer could seek to justify the use of the copyrighted work as a fair
use under 17 U.S.C. § 107, as described in the following section.

16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
17. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). “In any judicial
proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of
the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated
in the certificate.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
18. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
19. Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1340 (5th Cir. 1994)
(emphasis added) (quoting Plains Cotton Coop. Ass’n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807
F.2d 1256, 1260 (5th Cir. 1987)).
20. The requirement for originality of copyrighted works is found in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 of the Constitution.
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2. The advent of fair use
Originally established in Folsom v. Marsh21 in 1841, the doctrine of
fair use generally provides that certain uses of a copyrighted work may
not infringe if the uses create a significantly greater public benefit. This
exception has been important for educational institutions, libraries, and
various other individuals that use copyrighted works in areas such as
teaching, comment, criticism, and scholarship.22
The doctrine of fair use, officially codified in 197623 as 17 U.S.C. §
107, sets out four factors to be considered in determining what
constitutes a fair use: (1) the commercial nature, character, and purpose
of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the copyrighted work that was used; and (4) “the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.”24 Courts use the factors set out in § 107 to determine whether or
not an individual has engaged in a fair use of a copyrighted material.25
For example, public libraries and schools may successfully invoke the

21. 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (establishing fair use based on the
“nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of
the original work”).
22. See § 107 of the Copyright Act, which states as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 107. Many such groups have noticed the weakening of the fair use doctrine and have
called for the preservation of fair use. See, e.g., CETUS, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
available at http://www.cetus.org/fairindex.html (last visited October 28, 2003); see also NOW
PLAYING:
YOUR
PRIVACY
RIGHTS,
available
at
http://www.protectfairuse.org/
consumers/now_playing.html (last visited October 28, 2003).
23. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5658, 5679–
80.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS, available at
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/copypol2.htm#test (last visited October 28, 2003)
(stating that the inquiry should consist of the following four questions: “1. What is the character of
the use? 2. What is the nature of the work to be used? 3. How much of the work will you use? 4.
What effect would this use have on the market for the original or for permissions if the use were
widespread?”).
25. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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fair use defense where the character of their use is academic, educational,
and noncommercial.26
3. Reactions to the doctrine of fair use
The digital fair use exception evokes contradictory reactions. At first
blush, the thought that a purchaser may legally make archival copies of
copyrighted music, software, or DVD’s may be uncomfortable. Such
activities present the risk of permanently impairing the value of the
copyrighted material, destroying the monetary investment the material
represents, and ultimately discouraging development of and investment
in such materials.
Clearly, where a use in question does not qualify as a fair use, such
as copying and distribution of music or software, the copyright holder
can seek judicial intervention and appropriate damages proportional to
the harm. Nevertheless, in cases where the copyright holder is harmed by
a fair use, such as a negative book review or making a book widely
available for the public in a library,27 the judicial policy of fair use wins
out. The Ninth Circuit summarized this policy by stating:
The copyright holder has a property interest in preventing others from
reaping the fruits of his labor, not in preventing the authors and thinkers
of the future from making use of, or building upon, his advances. The
process of creation is often an incremental one, and advances building

26. Specific exceptions to copyright infringement are also provided for performances and
displays made in an educational setting. See 17 U.S.C. § 110. Furthermore, on November 2, 2002,
President George W. Bush signed into law the Technology, Education and Copyright Harmonization
Act, which “redefines the terms and conditions on which accredited, nonprofit educational
institutions throughout the U.S. may use copyright protected materials in distance education—
including on websites and by other digital means—without permission from the copyright owner and
without payment of royalties.” Kenneth D. Crews, New Copyright Law for Distance Education: The
Meaning
and
Importance
of
the
TEACH
Act,
available
at
http://www.ala.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Our_Association/Offices/ALA_Washington/Issues2/Co
pyright1/Distance_Education_and_the_TEACH_Act/teachsummary.pdf (last visited October 28, 2003).
27. Interestingly, there are very few drawbacks presented to software developers when a
valid purchaser of their software simply protects their investment by making an archival copy. While
there is a great potential for harm in allowing consumers to copy or modify software, unauthorized
copying, selling, or other use may be prosecuted under copyright law. Of course, software
developers may simply hope that consumers would be forced to repurchase damaged or lost
software; however, such a result might seem unfair, especially given the nonthreatening nature of
archival copying.
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on past developments are far more common than radical new
concepts.28

After weighing the prospective harms that such fair uses may have to the
value of a copyrighted material, courts and Congress agree that such uses
are justifiable under this policy and other considerations.29
This Comment asserts that through shrinkwrap licenses, software
developers are able to circumvent the fair use exception and capture
federally granted rights that rightly belong to the public. The following
section introduces the climate surrounding copyright law in recent
decades, the advent of shrinkwrap licenses, and congressional action
taken to protect computer software.
B. Shrinkwrap Licenses Were Created to Provide
Greater Protection to Computer Software
1. The climate in copyright law was not amicable to broad protection of
computer software
Software developers may have been disappointed by the judicial
enforcement of copyright protection of computer software for several
reasons. First, the judicial mood may not have been amicable to
broadening copyright protection for software programs given the original
intent of copyright purpose and policy. Second, with the advent of patent
protection for computer programs, courts might have consciously
decided that copyright law no longer provided an appropriate cause of
action for violations of computer software. Finally, the advent of
shrinkwrap licenses—which provide protection comparable to copyright
law—might have persuaded courts that copyright protection for such
software would be redundant.

28. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302, 307 n.6 (9th Cir. 1992)).
29. In addition, the creation of alternative products in the market may increase competition,
which has long been a hallmark of the economy. For example, alternative products may impel
nonprice competition through warranties, enhanced service and support, etc. Such alternatives can
benefit the consumer and the economy by encouraging competition, impeding antitrust violations,
and encouraging further development and refinement of the products on the market. Finally, when an
individual seeks to protect the idea through a patent, such protection may be available when
appropriate. While a discussion of patent law provisions that allow computer software to be patented
is beyond the scope of this paper, the reader may profit from other sources. See, e.g., BITLAW,
SOFTWARE PATENT INDEX, available at http://www.bitlaw.com/software-patent/index.html (last
visited October 28, 2003).
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The judicial mood may have been unfavorable for an expansion of
copyright protection over computer software, especially because
copyright protects expression, not broad ideas.30 Copyright protection
was limited to only the expression in the program and could not protect
“the actual processes or methods embodied in the program.”31 Thus,
eager software developers struggled to protect blossoming ideas from
potential competitors and corral all financial benefit for themselves.32 In
fact, the explosion of the computer industry in recent decades almost
certainly caught courts unprepared, if not unwilling, to use copyright law
to deal with emerging computer software technology. In 1975,
representative of the judicial attitude prior to the software boom, the
Supreme Court said that the Copyright Act should be construed in light
of its basic purpose to enhance the public store of knowledge,33 which
meant that information surrendered to the public domain could not be
retrieved and granted protection under copyright law. According to this
principle, copyright law would not protect an entire computer program if
it contained copyrightable and noncopyrightable elements.34 Lawfully
30. Patent law protects ideas and methods while copyright law protects only the expression
of those ideas or methods. This distinction is often referred to as the idea-expression dichotomy. The
idea-expression dichotomy offers a very basic explanation of what subject matter is eligible for
copyright protection. As stated in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000), “In no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.” For a more detailed analysis of the idea-expression
dichotomy, see 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(A)(1),
(B)(2)(a) (2000).
31. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding
“that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program,
and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of
copyright law” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5667)).
32. A software developer could pursue patent protection for her idea, but it was not until
1981 when the Supreme Court upheld patent protection for a computer program in Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). Since that time, an increasing number of patents have been issued for
computer programs. See Randall M. Whitmeyer, A Plea for Due Processes: Defining the Proper
Scope of Patent Protection for Computer Software, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1991).
33. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). The court stated:
“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly . . . lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”
When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act
must be construed in light of this basic purpose.
Id. (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
34. Courts have developed several tests for copyright infringement that can be applied to
computer programs. These tests help determine what, if any, of the computer program can qualify as
protectable expression under copyright law. Such tests include: the idea-expression dichotomy, see,
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then, unscrupulous competitors could decompile a copyrighted program
and create a different expression thereof that performed an equivalent
function.35 Without incurring the same developmental costs as the
original software developer, competitors could backdoor a copyright and
produce a rival product.36 Software developers wanted more—they
wished to protect their software more broadly, but could not rely on
copyright law to do so.
The advent of patent protection for software programs might also
have weakened corresponding copyright protection. In 1981, the
Supreme Court reversed two of its prior decisions and held that computer
software programs were eligible for patent protection.37 At this point,
judicial opinion might have subtly shifted the burden of protecting
computer software from copyright law to the shoulders of patent law,
which could offer protection to ideas, not just the expression thereof.38
Armed with the broader protection afforded by a patent, software
developers would now be able to sue for infringement of their ideas and

e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); the ordinary observer
test, see, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990); look and feel, see, e.g.,
Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 267–68 (2d Cir. 2001); and the merger doctrine, see, e.g.,
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). Nevertheless, cunning software developers could
effectively create programs that overcome such tests. Therefore, software developers turned to the
shrinkwrap license for greater protection.
35. In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
the court suggests that reverse engineering is acceptable only where the accused program is a “new
work” that does not free ride on another’s creative efforts. “[R]everse engineering object code to
discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a fair use[,]” but “fair use reproductions of
a computer program must not exceed what is necessary to understand the unprotected elements of
the work.” Id. Additionally, in order to invoke the fair use defense of reverse engineering, a
defendant must be able show that he was in possession of an authorized copy of a literary work. See
id.
36. While a competitor may still be liable for legal copying, there are numerous advantages
that can be derived through decompilation and reverse engineering of competing programs. For one,
a competitor may effectively reduce the head start derived by the original developer in capturing
market share for a particular software program. Especially in the software industry, a critical
component of success is whether a company is able to deliver its software to market before its
competitors.
37. The previous decisions that held that computer software programs were not patentable
were Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), which
simply followed the decision in Gottschalk. Later, in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), the
court found that a computer software program is patentable unless it simply performs a calculation.
38. The author suggests that as software patents became increasingly popular in the 1980s,
the courts began to see copyright law as the less-effective way for software developers to protect
their software. While it seems unlikely that courts would treat certain claims preferentially, it would
nevertheless be possible that the preferred means (i.e., patent protection) became the ideal means of
protecting computer software in the eyes of the courts.
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methods, not just for direct copying. Thus, with patent protection now
available for software programs, courts may have begun to look to patent
law in order to provide the broad protection urged by software
developers.
Copyright law’s scope of protection for computer software may have
also been weakened when courts began to approve and uphold
increasingly prevalent shrinkwrap licenses. An increasing reliance on
shrinkwrap license provisions may have influenced courts to look less
toward copyright law for protection of computer software;39 thus,
copyright law’s power to protect computer software may have faded
while contract law’s power increased.40
It appears that judicial opinion changed from an outright denial of
shrinkwrap license validity41 to a complete acknowledgement of
shrinkwrap validity without allowing preemption by analogous,
conflicting copyright claims.42 As suggested above, this result may be
due to the failure of copyright law to protect computer software as
developers had hoped, coupled with the importance of such protection
and the availability and ability of contract law to create that protection.
Thus, a decreasing reliance on copyright law may have contributed to the
atrophy of copyright protection for computer software.
2. The advent of shrinkwrap licenses
Software developers’ intense economic interest to protect their
software and reduce the costs involved in “forming idiosyncratic

39. Although a more complete analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this Comment,
the author submits it is possible that the Copyright Act could have provided the kind of protection of
computer programs that the DMCA and UCITA have provided. See infra Part IV for a useful
explanation of how digital fair use can protect the interests of worried software developers.
40. Several court decisions support this idea. The trend, evidenced by decisions of several
courts, shows that courts slowly moved away from outright denial of the validity of shrinkwrap
licenses toward a complete support of such licenses. Given such momentum, courts later began to
find that federal copyright law did not preempt shrinkwrap licenses. While not explicit, this shift
may have resulted due to the efforts of computer software developers to find protection beyond the
moorings of copyright law. See Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d
Cir. 1991) and Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993)
as examples of early cases finding shrinkwrap licenses invalid. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenburg, 86
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) and Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
as examples of the recent judicial trend towards general support of shrinkwrap licenses.
41. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d 91; Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir.
1988) (Vault II); Ariz. Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. 759.
42. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453; Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., 846 F.
Supp. 208, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
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agreements” led to the creation and enforcement of shrinkwrap
licenses.43 Without some form of additional protection for their
investment,44 developers would not likely embark upon the creation of
heavily researched and highly developed programs. Therefore, in the
early 1990s, computer software developers sought protection under the
blanket of state contract law via shrinkwrap licenses.
Typically, a shrinkwrap license is prominently displayed on the
outside of computer software packaging. In some circumstances, a
consumer is unable to open the software without unwrapping the words
of the licensing agreement45—including phrases such as “OPENING
THIS SOFTWARE PACKAGE INDICATES YOUR ACCEPTANCE
OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS STATED IN THE LICENSE
AGREEMENT IN USER’S MANUAL.”46 Alternatively, while
installing software, a consumer might be presented with a licensing
agreement that must be accepted in order to complete installation of the
software.47 Should the consumer opt not to agree to the licensing

43. Shrinkwrap license agreements not only provide software developers with the ability to
enforce strict rights, but such licenses also decrease the costs of administering agreements with each
individual consumer. See Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software Development: The
Enforceability of Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, 39 (2000).
44. According to the Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2002, Congress found that in
2001 alone, the software industry lost a breathtaking $1.8 billion dollars due to software piracy. See
H.R. REP. NO. 107-5057 at 2 (2002) (providing the congressional findings regarding the costs of
intellectual property infringement according to different sectors), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_bills&
docid=f:h5057ih.txt.pdf (last visited October 28, 2003). Additionally, the Business Software
Alliance reported that software piracy cost the United States over 100,000 jobs, over $5.3 billion in
wages, and over $1.4 billion in tax revenues in 2001 and again in 2002. See BUSINESS SOFTWARE
ALLIANCE, SOFTWARE PIRACY AND THE LAW, SOFTWARE PIRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, available
at http://www.bsa.org/resources/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/ security/getfile.cfm&PageID=1230
(last visited October 28, 2003); BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, U.S. STATE SOFTWARE PIRACY
STUDY, available at http://global.bsa.org/ statestudy/ (last visited October 28, 2003).
45. Under contract law, a shrinkwrap license must either provide all of the material terms to
the contract in the words of the shrinkwrap license itself or clearly and unequivocally incorporate by
reference another document wherein the terms of the license may be found. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209–12 (1978). For a discussion of the validity of shrinkwrap licenses
under contract law, see Kell Corrigan Mercer, Note, Shrink-Wrap Licenses: Consumer Shrink-Wrap
Licenses and Public Domain Materials: Copyright Preemption and Uniform Commercial Code
Validity in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1287 (1997).
46. This phrase, used for the Statement of License of Professor Kayton’s 2002 PTO
ExamWare CD-Rom, Version 3.4, is printed on a small, narrow tape strip that seals the CD case
closed. This tape strip must be broken before the user can install the software.
47. This sort of licensing agreement, performed while installing the software, is commonly
referred to as a “clickwrap” agreement. Clickwrap and shrinkwrap agreements are presented at
different times, but are otherwise substantially similar. See supra note 1.
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agreement, the software often instructs the consumer to return the
software for a refund.48
a. Shrinkwrap licenses have been heavily criticized. Shrinkwrap
licenses have not only created greater protection for computer software,
but have also invited intense debate.49 Shrinkwrap licenses have been
deemed good and bad for several reasons. Shrinkwrap licenses are
valuable because they cut down the time otherwise required to
individually contract with each consumer, provide a favorable and
uniform agreement for the developer, and allow developers additional
protection for their software. Nevertheless, shrinkwrap licenses have also
been criticized for many reasons. First, many have questioned the
validity of shrinkwrap licenses under the strictures of contract law itself,
arguing that there is no assent or consideration as traditionally required
for contract formation.50 Second, shrinkwrap licenses might be contracts
of adhesion because the consumer has no ability to negotiate the terms of
the contract; as such, shrinkwrap licenses would be invalid.51 Others
have argued that where shrinkwrap licenses provide rights that contradict
the Copyright Act, federal law should preempt the state contract claim.52
Additionally, as this Comment contends, breach of contract claims based
on shrinkwrap licenses should be preempted by federal copyright law
because they do not embody an extra element of bargain and are
therefore indistinguishable from the rights enumerated in § 106 of the
Copyright Act.

48. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 256 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault
II) (stating that the purchaser of the software should return the software for a refund if the purchaser
chose not to assent to the terms of the license).
49. See Garry L. Founds, Note, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Licenses: 2B or Not 2B?, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 99 (1999); Brett L. Tolman, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg: The End Does Not Justify
the Means in Federal Copyright Analysis, 1998 BYU L. REV. 303 (1998); Mercer, supra note 45, at
1320; Goodman, supra note 11.
50. See Founds, supra note 49, at 101 & n.8, 102–03.
51. Id.
52. See Tolman, supra note 49. Tolman’s piece argues that the ProCD court improperly
found that ProCD’s state contract law claims were not preempted by federal copyright law because
the ProCD agreement sought to protect unprotectable information and thus conflicted with federal
copyright law. This Comment suggests that the extra element of bargain, relied on by several courts
to distinguish breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses from federal copyright claims,
is improper because shrinkwrap licenses are not negotiated contracts.
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After a very cold reception to shrinkwrap licenses,53 courts now find
them generally enforceable.54 Additionally, some courts have found that
provisions in shrinkwrap licenses that contradict copyright law principles
were not preempted by copyright law.55 Indicative of the increasing
support for shrinkwrap licenses, several groups rallied behind the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act56 (UCITA), later
referred to as Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).57
Article 2B supports validation of “mass-market licenses” such as
shrinkwrap licenses.58 However, Article 2B’s support of shrinkwrap

53. Courts initially reacted unfavorably when considering the validity of shrinkwrap licenses.
See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that a box top
license disclaiming all prior oral representations was invalid because it materially altered the terms
of the agreement entered into over the phone); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F.
Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993) (finding that a license was invalid because there was no express assent to
the terms of the license).
54. Shrinkwrap licenses are now generally accepted as enforceable by courts. ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that a shrinkwrap license forbidding commercial
use of the software was enforceable); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d
328, 337 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding enforceable a clickwrap license that did not create an undue
hardship on the licensee or materially change the terms of previously-entered-into contracts). In
ProCD, the Seventh Circuit focused on U.C.C. section 2-204 to support the conclusion that the
offeror, as the master of the offer, can specify what type of conduct by the buyer denotes acceptance
(in the case of a shrinkwrap, acceptance would be use without returning the software), and thereby
incorporate the terms of the shrinkwrap license into the agreement. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450–55.
Ultimately, the ProCD ruling has created a very low bar for shrinkwrap or clickwrap licenses
to pass—“the absence of a timely rejection [is] sufficient to show assent.” I.Lan Sys., Inc., 183 F.
Supp. 2d at 337. In other words, implicit assent is sufficient to bind the purchaser. Id. at 338 (“If
ProCD was correct to enforce a shrinkwrap license agreement, where any assent is implicit, then it
must also be correct to enforce a clickwrap license agreement, where the assent is explicit.”).
55. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that
the shrinkwrap license involved was valid and was not preempted by federal copyright law); ProCD,
86 F.3d at 1447 (finding that the shrinkwrap license involved was valid and was not preempted by
federal copyright law).
available
at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/UcitaFinal
56. See
UCITA,
100.pdf.htm (last visited October 29, 2003); see also MARK K. ANDERSON, NOW, UCITA . . . LATER,
YOU DON’T, available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/03/07/ ucita.idg/ (last visited
October 29, 2003) (summarizing the arguments of many critics of UCITA).
57. See U.C.C. § 2B (Proposed Draft 1999), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
library/ulc/ucc2b/zb299,htm.
58. It is unsurprising that these changes in the law were proposed by numerous interested
parties. Given the plight of the computer software industry, the writing was on the wall. According
to some sources, Article 2B was heavily funded by the software industry. See, e.g., CHRISTY
HUDGINS-BONAFIELD, UCC 2B: THE NEW LAW OF SHRINK-WRAP, available at
http://www.networkcomputing.com/1008/1008f1side7.html (last visited October 29, 2003); see also
William J. Woodward, Jr., Private Legislation in the United States—How the Uniform Commercial
Code Becomes Law, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 453 (1999); JAMES S. HUGGINS, UCITA: UNIFORM
COMPUTER
INFORMATION
TRANSACTIONS
ACT,
available
at
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validation is subject to the condition that a license not be
unconscionable.59 Additionally, Article 2B only supports shrinkwrap
licenses insofar as they are not preempted by federal legislation.60
Although many groups applaud the growing support for shrinkwrap
licenses, such changes threaten the digital fair use doctrine.
b. Shrinkwrap licenses limit the digital fair use and first sale
doctrines, thus prohibiting otherwise legal uses of a copyrighted work.
Shrinkwrap licenses often conflict61 with the doctrines of fair use, first
sale, and reverse engineering,62 a category of fair use. A normal
shrinkwrap license agreement seeks to prohibit the licensee from
engaging in certain activities that would otherwise be lawful under
patent, copyright, or trade secret law. Representative of terms commonly

http://www.jamesshuggins.com/h/tek1/ucita.htm (last visited October 29, 2003) (listing the
proponents and opponents of UCITA).
59. See J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 798
(1999).
60. See UCITA § 105(a) (Proposed Official Draft 2000), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita01.pdf (last visited October 29, 2003) (“A provision of this [Act] which
is preempted by federal law is unenforceable to the extent of the preemption.”); see also Pratik A.
Shah, The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85, 105
(2000).
61. See Founds, supra note 49 (discussing the interaction of the then new terms of UCITA
and their interplay with existing copyright law, especially regarding digital fair use, the first sale
doctrine, and reverse engineering).
62. Reverse engineering may be broadly defined as the process by which an individual
disassembles an invention to determine what the components are and how the components
interrelate. The individual then recreates the invention in a subtly different way so that it is not an
exact copy of the original. In so doing, the individual can exclude protected aspects of the original
invention and thereby create a noninfringing device. Through reverse engineering, software
purchasers may decompile a computer program and create a program that is functionally equivalent
to the decompiled program.
The doctrine of reverse engineering is consistent with the goals of copyright law because it
allows individuals to build on previous inventions, thereby promoting the progress of science. See
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The purpose and
policy behind allowing reverse engineering as a lawful fair use (providing exemption from what
could otherwise be a copyright violation), is summarized in Atari when the court states:
The copyright holder has a property interest in preventing others from reaping the
fruits of his labor, not in preventing the authors and thinkers of the future from
making use of, or building upon, his advances. The process of creation is often an
incremental one, and advances building on past developments are far more common
than radical new concepts.
Id. at 843 (quoting New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302, 307 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1992)); see also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
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found in shrinkwrap licenses, the license in Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd.63 (the Vault license) forces the user to agree not to
“transfer, sublicense, rent, lease, convey, copy, modify, translate, convert
to another programming language, decompile or disassemble the
Licensed Software for any purpose without VAULT’s prior written
consent.”64 However, the fair use doctrine allows a user to copy, modify,
translate, convert, decompile, or disassemble the software in certain
circumstances; furthermore, under the first sale doctrine discussed below,
a user can also lawfully transfer, sublicense, rent, lease, or convey the
software.65 This subsection will analyze the Vault license under these
two doctrines.
Shrinkwrap licenses often prohibit several fair uses. While the Vault
license forbids copying, modification, conversion, decompilation,
disassembly, and translation of the software, these activities can qualify
as fair uses under the fair use exception.66 Additionally, the Vault
shrinkwrap license prohibits any public performance, which may also
qualify as a fair use.67 The Vault license also expressly precludes the
reverse engineering of computer software through decompilation or
disassembly; this blanket prohibition against reverse engineering directly
contradicts decisions set out by several courts.68
63. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault II).
64. Id. at 257 n.2.
65. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1239, 1247 (1995) (discussing the conflict of shrinkwrap licensing agreements with the fair use and
first sale doctrines).
66. Fair use, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107, was initially created to help protect public interests
realized through use of a copyrighted work that would otherwise be illegal were it not for the nature
of the use. See Atari, 975 F.2d at 843 (“Where the infringement is small in relation to the new work
created, the fair user is profiting largely from his own creative efforts rather than free-riding on
another’s work. A prohibition on all copying whatsoever would stifle the free flow of ideas without
serving any legitimate interest of the copyright holder.” (quoting New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at
307 n.6)); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966)
(considering the “public benefit” made available through unauthorized use of a copyrighted work);
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (determining that the defendant had
engaged in a “justifiable use” of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work). Although courts have sought to
establish a list of “fair uses,” this doctrine has nevertheless been classified as “the most troublesome
in the whole law of copyright.” Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
67. Additionally, certain public performances may be exempted from copyright infringement
under § 110 of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2000).
68. The Ninth Circuit upheld the fair use defense of reverse engineering in Sony Computer
Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). In that case, Connectix copied Sony’s
PlayStation BIOS in order to reverse engineer the PlayStation and create a noninfringing video game
system that could function with PlayStation game discs. Id. at 598–99; see also Atari, 975 F.2d at
843. Indicative perhaps of the recognition of case law, some shrinkwrap licenses implicitly
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Finally, shrinkwrap licenses have also been criticized for restrictions
created by circumventing the first sale doctrine. Under the first sale
doctrine, the “sale” of computer software transfers to the owner the right
to transfer, resell, or otherwise dispose of the program;69 § 117 of the
Copyright Act also allows the owner to make copies of the software in
order to properly utilize or archive the software.70 Craftily, however,
software developers are able to circumvent the first sale doctrine because
the purchase of software is not a “sale”—through shrinkwrap licenses,
software developers condition the use of the software upon a purchaser’s
acceptance of a mere license to the product.71 For example, under the
terms of the Vault license, the purchaser is really a licensee—thus, she is
not allowed to rent, lease, transfer, or copy the software.
Courts and scholars continue to dispute the virtues of shrinkwrap
licenses. The following part addresses the judicial debate and asserts that
copyright law should preempt breach of contract claims based on
shrinkwrap licenses under § 301 of the Copyright Act.

recognize that reverse engineering may be legal under federal law. For example, the license
accompanying RealNetworks’ RealOne Player states: “You may not: . . . modify, translate, reverse
engineer, decompile, disassemble (except to the extent that this restriction is expressly prohibited by
law) . . . .” See REALNETWORKS, INC., END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT, RealNetworks Products,
available at http:// www.ncns.com/RealNetworksLicense.html (last visited November 3, 2003).
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of
a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord.”). Additionally, § 109(b) states that it is illegal for
any person in possession of a particular copy of a computer program[,] . . . for the
purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage, [to] dispose of, or authorize the
disposal of, the . . . computer program . . . by rental, lease, or lending, or by any other act
or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or lending.
Id. § 109(b).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 117. While § 117 refers to copying a program so that it may be properly
utilized, many courts have found that licensees are not “owners” under § 117, and that § 117 does
not allow licensees the right of unauthorized use. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,
991 F.2d 511, 518 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing an owner of software from a licensee and
finding that § 117 does not apply to licensees because the software is licensed and not sold);
Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 367 (E.D. Va.
1994); CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 356 (M.D. Ga. 1992). Nevertheless,
some courts have applied § 117 without distinguishing between licensees and owners. See, e.g.,
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault II); Foresight Res. Corp. v.
Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1009–10 (D. Kan. 1989).
71. UCITA has verified that the sale of computer software will only amount to a grant of
license and not of ownership. See Draft of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act,
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/citaam99.pdf (last visited October 29, 2003).
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III. THE JUDICIAL DEBATE CONTINUES: SHOULD FEDERAL COPYRIGHT
LAW PREEMPT SHRINKWRAP LICENSE PROVISIONS?
The judicial and scholarly debate continues as to whether copyright
law preempts breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses.
Courts and scholars alike have suggested that shrinkwrap licenses are
preempted through (1) express preemption under § 301 of the Copyright
Act and (2) conflict preemption due to state law’s conflict with federal
law and the goals and purposes of federal copyright law.72 Although
shrinkwrap licenses are generally enforceable,73 the preemption debate
continues. Currently, courts disagree as to whether federal copyright law
preempts breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses.74

72. The Third Circuit in Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp. stated:
The Supreme Court has recognized three ways in which federal law may preempt,
and thereby displace, state law: (1) “express preemption,” (2) “field preemption” (which
is also sometimes referred to as “implied preemption”), or (3) “conflict preemption.”
Express preemption arises when there is an explicit statutory command that state law be
displaced. . . .
Under field or implied preemption principles, state law may be displaced “if federal
law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”
Finally, state law may be displaced under conflict preemption principles if the state
law in question presents a conflict with federal law in one of two situations: when it is
impossible to comply with both the state and the federal law or when the state law
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”
189 F.3d 377, 381–82 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citations omitted). Because copyright law has
granted state law the right to concurrently occupy the field, only the first and third avenues for
preemption are useful. Many scholars have commented on various strategies of preemption. See
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Owners’ Rights and Users’ Privileges on the Internet: Federal
Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 511 (1997); Mercer, supra
note 45; see, e.g., Vault II, 847 F.2d at 270 (finding that the shrinkwrap license involved was
preempted by federal copyright law); ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996),
rev’d, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
73. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
74. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that a
shrinkwrap license was not preempted by federal copyright law), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588
(2003); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454 (finding that the shrinkwrap license involved was valid and was not
preempted by federal copyright law). But see Info. Handling Servs. v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (stating that a breach of contract claim based on a
shrinkwrap license did not involve any extra element of bargain and would therefore be preempted
by copyright law).
Certainly, it would not be appropriate to assume that copyright law has no preemptive power.
In fact, as Judge Dyk noted in his dissent in Bowers, “ProCD and the other contract cases are also
careful not to create a blanket rule that all contracts will escape preemption.” Bowers, 320 F.3d at
1338 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
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Section A argues that preemption under § 301 of the Copyright Act is
proper because breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses
do not embody an extra element that distinguishes them from copyright
claims. Section B argues that preemption of such contract claims is
supported by the conflict preemption analysis in order to preserve the
important policies embodied in the digital fair use doctrine.
A. Preemption Analysis Under § 301 of the Copyright Act and the Extra
Element Test in Shrinkwrap Licenses
Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts state law when the rights
created by that law are equivalent to those protected by copyright law.75
Section 301 provides that neither common law nor state law may entitle a
person to any right “within the subject matter of copyright as specified
by sections 102 and 103” that is “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright” under § 106.76
Therefore, in order for federal copyright law to preempt a breach of
contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license agreement, the contract
claim must meet a two-pronged test. First, the contract claim must
involve a class of works, as defined by § 102 or § 103 of the Copyright
Act, which could qualify for copyright protection.77 Second, the contract
75. The federal report states the following:
The evolving common law rights of “privacy,” “publicity,” and trade secrets, and the
general laws of defamation and fraud, would remain unaffected as long as the causes of
action contain elements, such as an invasion of personal rights or a breach of trust or
confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright infringement.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.
76. Section 301 provides:
(a) [A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within
the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright
as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and
whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the
common law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or
statutes of any State with respect to—
....
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 . . . .
17 U.S.C. § 301(a), (b)(3) (2000).
77. Section 102 of the Copyright Act provides that in general:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
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claim must involve “legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106.”78 Courts do not normally struggle with the
first prong; however, the determination of equivalency is still debated.
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102. Section 103 provides:
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations
and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in
which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such
material has been used unlawfully.
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not
affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright
protection in the preexisting material.
17 U.S.C. § 103.
78. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3). Section 106 provides that:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106.
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The debate has focused on whether the rights protected in
shrinkwrap licenses are equivalent to those enumerated in § 106 of the
Copyright Act. The rights prohibited by a typical shrinkwrap license
include copying, modifying, reverse engineering, decompiling,
transferring, or having public performance of the software. The second
prong of the preemption analysis asks whether those prohibited rights are
equivalent to the rights under § 106 (already vested in the copyright
holder) such as copying, preparation of derivative works, distribution,
public performance, and public display.79 At first blush, the typical
shrinkwrap license mentioned above is a candidate for preemption
because it protects rights that are equivalent to many, if not all of the §
106 rights. Although many courts have found that copyright law can
preempt conflicting breach of contract claims,80 several courts have
found that it cannot.81 Courts concluding that copyright law could not
preempt breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses have
done so by distinguishing federal copyright claims from contract claims
using the extra element test.82

79. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
80. See, e.g., Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993); Worth v.
Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985 (C.D.
Cal. 1996); Wharton v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 144 (D. Md. 1995); Patrick v.
Francis, 887 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.N.Y. 1995); Artie Fields Prods. v. Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc., 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539, 1994 WL 559331 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Perro v. Wemco, Inc., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1475, 1994 WL 382590 (E.D. La. 1994); Aldridge v. The Gap, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 312 (N.D.
Tex. 1994); Gemcraft Homes Inc. v. Sumurdy, 688 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Tex. 1988); see also Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault II) (finding that a provision
in the Louisiana License Act prohibiting adaptation or decompilation of a computer program was
preempted by federal copyright law because it touched upon an area of federal copyright law, the
preemption of which in turn preempted the shrinkwrap license relying on the Louisiana Act).
81. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir.) (finding that a
shrinkwrap license was not preempted by federal copyright law), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588
(2003); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that the shrinkwrap license
involved was valid and was not preempted by federal copyright law).
82. See Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1342–43 (holding that federal copyright law did not preempt a
breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license because the extra element of bargain
distinguished the contract claim from a copyright claim); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453–54 (finding that
the state contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license had an extra element and was not preempted
by federal copyright law). But see Info. Handling Servs. v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1571 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (stating that a breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license did not
involve any extra element of bargain and therefore would be preempted by copyright law).
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1. The extra element test in ProCD v. Zeidenberg,83 Information
Handling Services. v. LRP Publications, Inc.,84 and Bowers v. Baystate
Technologies85
The extra element test86 has been employed by many courts to
determine whether state rights are equivalent to, and thus preempted by,
rights granted to copyright holders under § 106 of the Copyright Act.87
Under this test, a state claim is not equivalent to a copyright claim if the
contract claim requires an accuser to show an element that is superfluous
to the copyright claim.88 For example, if the state claim requires that a
fiduciary relationship exist between the parties—an element not required
for the copyright infringement claim—the extra element of the fiduciary
relationship makes the state claim different from and not preempted by
the copyright claim.89 Thus, a “state law claim is not preempted if the

83. ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447.
84. 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
85. 320 F.3d 1317.
86. It appears that Professor Melville Nimmer was very influential in developing the “extra
element” test. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
rev’d on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing MELVIN B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 1.01(B) at 1-7 n.22, 1-11 (1978)); see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01(B)(1) (2003) (explaining the development of the extra
element test and citing courts that coined the phrase and used the test).
87. Courts have applied the extra element test in various circumstances. See, e.g., Wrench
LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the extra element of a promise to
pay for the use of the work distinguished the contract claim from a copyright claim); Samara Bros. v.
Wal-Mart Stores, 165 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding the extra element of “intentional deception”
in distinguishing an unfair trade practice claim from a copyright claim); United States ex rel. Berge
v. Bd. of Trs., 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding preemption of an intellectual property
conversion claim because breach of trust in a relationship and harm received due to the alleged
violation were not extra elements that distinguished the conversion claim from a copyright claim);
Harolds Stores v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 82 F.3d 1533 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that the extra element
was a “restraint of trade”); Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993) (applying
the extra element test and finding that the breach of contract claim involved was preempted by
copyright law because it did not contain an extra element that distinguished it from copyright law);
Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that
the extra element was a restriction on use of the licensed program that did not involve rights found in
§ 106); Valente-Kritzer Video v. Pinckney, 881 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the extra
element of fraud distinguished the state law claim from a copyright claim).
88. A successful copyright claim will typically require an accuser to show that the accused
party has infringed on the accuser’s exclusive rights granted to copyright holders under § 106 of the
Copyright Act.
89. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716–18 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[I]f
an ‘extra element’ is ‘required instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduction, performance,
distribution or display, in order to constitute a state-created cause of action, then the right does not
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‘extra element’ changes the ‘nature of the action so that it is qualitatively
different from a copyright infringement claim.’”90 Although numerous
courts have turned to the extra element in relation to state claims
generally,91 only a few courts have used the extra element test in
analyzing breach of contract claims involving shrinkwrap licenses.92
For example, in ProCD,93 the Seventh Circuit held that a two-party
contract based on a shrinkwrap license was not preempted by copyright
law. Even though the court did not use the term “extra element,” it found
that the contract claim was not equivalent to the rights within the general
scope of copyright because the contract required an extra element of
bargain.94 As a result, the court concluded that “a simple two-party
contract is not ‘equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright’ and therefore may be enforced.”95 However,
the court carefully “refrain[ed] from adopting a rule [establishing] that
anything with the label ‘contract’ is necessarily outside the preemption
clause.”96 The court then narrowly confined the application of the
holding to “shrinkwrap licenses of the kind before us.”97

lie “within the general scope of copyright,” and there is no preemption.’” (quoting 1 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01(B), at 1-1415 (1991))).
90. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 982 F.2d at 716 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mayer v. Josiah
Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)); see also Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
91. See supra note 89.
92. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that
federal copyright law did not preempt a breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license
because the extra element of bargain distinguished the contract claim from a copyright claim), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453–54 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding that the breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license did not create rights
equivalent to those protected under copyright law and was not preempted by federal copyright law);
Info. Handling Servs. v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (finding that
a breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license was qualitatively different from a copyright
claim because of defendant’s deceptive representations).
93. In ProCD, the software developer discriminated in its pricing for software based on
commercial and noncommercial use. The accused purchased software designated for noncommercial
purposes, which cost less and was accompanied by a shrinkwrap license that prohibited the
commercial use of the software. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
94. See id. at 1454.
95. Id. at 1455.
96. Id. The ProCD court also mentioned that “National Car Rental likewise recognizes the
possibility that some applications of the law of contract could interfere with the attainment of
national objectives and therefore come within the domain of § 301(a).” Id.
97. Id.
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In Bowers v. Baystate Technologies,98 the Federal Circuit also found
that the breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license was not
preempted by copyright law. The court reasoned that the breach of
contract claim contained the same extra element as found in ProCD: the
shrinkwrap license was a “private contractual agreement[] supported by
mutual assent and consideration.”99 The court also stated that “no
evidence suggests the First Circuit would extend [the holding in Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.100 allowing preemption of conflicting state
law] to include private contractual agreements supported by mutual
assent and consideration.”101
However, many disagree that bargain is actually present in
shrinkwrap licenses. In his dissent in Bowers, Judge Dyk suggests that
shrinkwrap contracts do not involve the bargain element because “[l]ike
any other contract of adhesion, the only choice offered to the purchaser is
to avoid making the purchase in the first place.”102 While conceding that
parties are free to contract away a fair use defense if the contract is freely
negotiated, Judge Dyk asserts that shrinkwrap licenses are not freely
negotiated contracts.103 Judge Dyk argues that as a result of shrinkwrap
contracts, a state may inappropriately eliminate federal law by
eviscerating the fair use defense.104 Professor Nimmer also warns against
this: “If copyright law is to maintain an autonomous existence, instead of
becoming an adjunct to whatever lawyers can draft into shrinkwrap
‘contracts,’ then its delicate balance must be respected.”105
98. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S.
Ct. 2588 (2003). The defendant in Bowers purchased software from the plaintiff which contained a
shrinkwrap license provision prohibiting reverse engineering of the software. Nevertheless, the
defendant reverse engineered the software and sold a nearly identical product. Id.
99. Id. at 1325. The court’s language, “mutual assent and consideration,” has been simplified
to the term “bargain” throughout this Comment. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY suggests that these two
terms can be combined. “Bargain” is defined therein as, “An agreement between parties for the
exchange of promises or performances.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 116 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis
added). “Assent” is defined as “Agreement, approval, or permission.” Id. at 88. “Consideration” is
defined as “Something of value . . . received by a promisor from a promisee.” Id. at 245. The
combination of these terms is therefore reasonable.
100. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault II) (finding that a provision in the Louisiana License
Act prohibiting adaptation or decompilation of a computer program was preempted by federal
copyright law because it touched upon an area of federal copyright law).
101. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325.
102. Id. at 1337 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1336–37 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (Dyk, J., dissenting).
105. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.04(B)(3)(a)
(2003) (discussing the many arguments against the holding of ProCD and its practical effects).
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Although several courts have relied on the extra element test to
distinguish breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses from
copyright claims, there are many reasons to question the logic and the
result. As shown below, shrinkwrap licenses do not involve the bargain
element relied on by these courts. Additionally, Congress intended § 301
to wield broad preemptive power in situations such as this, where the
claims are substantively equivalent and where precluding preemption
results in the dissolution of federal law.
2. Refocusing the judicial debate: The extra element test in light of the
legislative purposes of § 301
Ultimately, the judicial debate regarding preemption should be
refocused because § 301 contemplates rights, rather than claims, and
supports preemption in borderline areas where contract law might
frustrate the purposes of federal copyright law. It follows that
distinguishing contract claims from copyright claims using the extra
element test conflicts with § 301.106 This is clarified by resorting to the
legislative history of § 301, which courts have analyzed in determining
whether § 301 supports or undermines preemption of breach of contract
claims based on shrinkwrap licenses.107 At the center of the judicial
debate are the differences between the version of § 301 submitted to
Congress by the United States House of Representatives and the version
of § 301 submitted by the United States Senate.108 The Senate’s version
of § 301 enumerated certain rights that the Copyright Act could not
preempt, which enumeration included breach of contract claims.109
However, the House’s proposed version excluded breach of contract
claims from the list of rights that could not be preempted by the
Copyright Act. In the end, Congress adopted the House’s version.110
One interpretation of Congress’s preference for the House’s version
of § 301 suggests that Congress wanted § 301 to have preemptive power

106. See infra Part IV for an analysis under conflict preemption of how shrinkwrap licenses
contravene the purposes of copyright law.
107. See Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 435, 440–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(citing numerous authorities recognizing the confusing legislative history of § 301).
108. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 94-1733, at 78 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5819; Mercer, supra note 45, at 1305–06 (discussing the legislative history of § 301).
109. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 94-1733, at 78 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5819. This enumeration of rights is found in § 301(b)(3).
110. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
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over breach of contract claims.111 Thus, courts would not be justified in
disallowing preemption of otherwise equivalent contract claims simply
because an extra element was involved.112 A worthwhile distinction is
noted in that the extra element test focuses on distinguishing breach of
contract claims from copyright claims while the House report focuses on
rights.113 This distinction was not addressed in either ProCD or Bowers.
Nevertheless, this line of reasoning, which assumes that rights protected
by copyright law should have a broad scope of equivalence, is supported
by the House report of § 301.114
The House report states that copyright law should preempt any state
right that is equivalent to a right under copyright: “The intention of
section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights under the common law
or statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright.”115 The legislative
history adds the following:
The declaration of this principle in section 301 is intended to be stated
in the clearest and most unequivocal language possible, so as to
foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation of its unqualified intention
that Congress shall act preemptively, and to avoid the development of
any vague borderline areas between State and Federal protection.116

111. See id. § 301(a), (b)(3); see also Tolman, supra note 49, at 324 (discussing the
implications of the legislative history with regard to preemption of breach of contract claims).
112. While courts have found different kinds of extra elements that have distinguished state
claims from copyright claims, see supra notes 87 and 92, this Comment asserts that the extra
element of “bargain,” as discussed in Bowers and Information Handling Services, is not present in
breach of contract claims involving shrinkwrap licenses.
113. The implication of a distinction between “rights” and “claims” in the shrinkwrap license
context may be significant. First, a “claim” may require several elements, such as the claim in
Samara Bros. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 165 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998), which required intentional deception
and intentional copying. Thus, in the context of the “extra element” test, a “claim” requires an
additional act, distinct and separate from an act described in § 106 of the Copyright Act. § 106
“rights” include acts of reproduction, preparing derivative works, public performance and
distribution, and equivalents thereof. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. Importantly, § 301 refers only to “rights”
(not claims) that are “within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 . . . .” Id. §
301(a). Therefore, despite the extra element required by a claim, if the claim includes a right
enumerated in § 106, the House Report might suggest that this claim ought to be preempted by
copyright law. While such a result would require changes in the prosecution of lawsuits, it would not
eviscerate legal remedies for persons possessing copyrighted material. The full implication of a
claim-right distinction beyond the context of shrinkwrap licenses is beyond the scope of this
Comment. However, the author submits that this distinction is necessarily limited only to areas
involving § 301 of the Copyright Act.
114. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746–47.
115. Id. at 130, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746 (emphasis added).
116. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746.
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Further, courts should assume that the rights protected by copyright
law are very broad in scope:117
As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter
categories of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from
protecting it even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory copyright
because it is too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify, or because
it has fallen into the public domain.118

Several courts have followed these principles in finding that
copyright law preempts breach of contract claims based on shrinkwrap
contracts.119 For example, in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,120 the
Fifth Circuit found that a provision in the Louisiana License Act
prohibiting adaptation or decompilation of a computer program was
preempted by federal copyright law because it “‘touched upon [an] area’
of federal copyright law.”121 Vault sought to enforce its shrinkwrap
license, which provided that “you may not . . . copy, modify, translate,
convert to another programming language, decompile, or
disassemble.”122 Under the Louisiana Software License Enforcement
Act, Vault was permitted to prohibit decompilation or disassembly of a

117. Many courts have given copyright law a broad scope when determining whether statecreated rights were equivalent to rights protected under copyright law and have found preemption of
state law. See, e.g., Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993); Worth v.
Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985 (C.D.
Cal. 1996); Wharton v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 144 (D. Md. 1995); Patrick v.
Francis, 887 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.N.Y. 1995); Artie Fields Prods. v. Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc., 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539, 1994 WL 559331 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Perro v. Wemco, Inc., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1475, 1994 WL 382590 (E.D. La. 1994); Aldridge v. The Gap, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 312 (N.D.
Tex. 1994); Gemcraft Homes Inc. v. Sumurdy, 688 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Tex. 1988).
118. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5747.
119. For example, in Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that a claim based on Pennsylvania law was
preempted by federal copyright law because where the two are in conflict, “the Supremacy Clause is
decisive.” 520 F. Supp. 971, 993 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 683 F.2d
808 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988)
(Vault II) (finding that a provision in the Louisiana License Act prohibiting adaptation or
decompilation of a computer program was preempted by federal copyright law because it touched
upon an area of federal copyright law). But see Info. Handling Servs. v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (stating that a breach of contract claim based on a
shrinkwrap license would not be preempted by copyright law), later proceeding at 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15904 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2001).
120. Vault II, 847 F.2d at 269.
121. Id. (quoting Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 763 (E.D. La. 1987)
(Vault I)).
122. Id. at 257 n.2.
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licensed computer program.123 The court found that because the
Louisiana Act “‘touched upon the area’ of federal copyright law, its
provisions were preempted and Vault’s license agreement was
unenforceable.”124 The court supported its decision by noting that “the
Supreme Court held that ‘[w]hen state law touches upon the area of
[patent or copyright statutes], it is “familiar doctrine” that the federal
policy “may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied” by the state
law.’”125
Thus, the Supreme Court and others have recognized that the
legislative intent was not to preclude preemption of breach of contract
claims, but was in fact meant to preempt breach of contract claims that
dealt with rights within the scope of those rights protected under the
copyright act.126 Although Bowers and ProCD found that between
private parties,127 the extra element of bargain allegedly distinguished
the contract claim from a copyright claim, this extra element is not
present in shrinkwrap licenses. Not only is this extra element absent from
shrinkwrap licenses, but § 301’s contemplation of rights, rather than
claims, supports preemption in borderline areas where contract law might
frustrate the purposes of federal copyright law.

123. Id. at 269.
124. Id. (quoting Vault I, 655 F. Supp. at 763).
125. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
229 (1964)) (citation omitted).
126. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989) (“Establishment
of a federal rule of agency, rather than reliance on state agency law, is particularly appropriate here
given the Act’s express objective of creating national, uniform copyright law by broadly preempting
state statutory and common-law copyright regulation.”); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 228
(stating that federal policy cannot be set at naught). See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, wherein the court stated that allowing states to
expand the perimeters of copyright protection to their own liking, on the theory that
preemption would be no bar to state protection of material not meeting federal statutory
standards . . . would run directly afoul of one of the Act’s central purposes, to “avoid the
development of any vague borderline areas between State and Federal protection.”
723 F.2d 195, 199–200 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 130 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746.)
127. The court uses the word “private” to describe the shrinkwrap license agreement. See
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003). As
ProCD mentioned, “A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect
only their parties. . . .” ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996). This distinction is
not probative because, as argued herein, where shrinkwrap licenses are unconscionable, there is no
assent and no contract is formed. Nevertheless, this Comment asserts that there is no bargain,
whether private or not, present in shrinkwrap licenses.
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3. Distinguishing Bowers and ProCD: Shrinkwrap licenses do not
embody an extra element
Even assuming, arguendo, that preemption is properly determined by
applying the extra element test, breach of contract claims based on
shrinkwrap license agreements do not embody the extra element of
bargain as Bowers and ProCD suggest.128 First, this extra element is
absent because shrinkwrap licenses are contracts of adhesion that offer
no opportunity for bargaining.129 Second, this extra element is absent
because contract claims involving shrinkwrap licenses are
unconscionable. Additionally, this extra element is illusory because it is
possible to tenuously construe any transaction as embodying bargain or
an implied agreement. Finally, perpetuation of this extra element
improperly empowers state law in a “vague borderline area” where
Congress intended federal law to dominate.
Shrinkwrap licenses do not embody the extra element of bargain
because they are contracts of adhesion.130 An adhesion contract is
a standardized contract form offered to consumers of goods and
services essentially on a “take it or leave it” basis, without affording the
consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain, and under such conditions
that the consumer cannot obtain the desired product or service except
by acquiescing to the form of the contract.131

128. Garry L. Founds argues that such an argument is implausible; his concerns are addressed
below. See Founds, supra note 49, at 108 (stating that because shrinkwrap contracts are generally
enforceable as implied contracts, they should not be treated any differently than any other negotiated
agreement).
129. While this argument may appear to mix state law principles with federal law principles,
the extra element analysis necessarily invokes such a discussion where bargains are considered to be
the extra element present in shrinkwrap licenses. It is possible to argue that shrinkwrap licenses
should not be enforced solely from a contract law perspective. See id. (arguing that for clarity, the
issues of unconscionability and lack of negotiation should be resolved by turning to basic contract
law). While this is true, these contract issues are bundled into the federal arguments made in Bowers
and ProCD, and thus are best responded to in that same context.
130. For a discussion of why shrinkwrap licenses should be considered contracts of adhesion,
see Goodman, supra note 11, at 354–59. See also Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1336–37 (Dyk, J., dissenting);
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reasoning that contracts of adhesion
are “form contracts that are not subject to negotiation”); W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 566 (1971)
(“[Contracts] of adhesion do not express consent.”).
131. Bernstein v. GTE Directories Corp., 827 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added);
see also Shaffer v. Graybill, 68 Fed. Appx. 374 (3d Cir. 2003); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th
Cir. 2003); Gray v. Am. Express Co., 743 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Adhesion contracts allow a company with tremendous bargaining
power132 to bind a consumer, without any bargaining power, to a “take it
or leave it” ultimatum. Following the analysis employed by one court, a
shrinkwrap license is a contract of adhesion because the license consists
of standardized terms, the proffering party has far superior bargaining
power, and the license is offered on a nonnegotiable “take it or leave it”
basis.133 There is no assent (and therefore no bargain) where there is a
gross inequality of bargaining power together with terms that
unreasonably favor the licensor.134 Therefore, the extra element of
bargain is not present in contract claims involving shrinkwrap
licenses.135

132. With regard to computer software, software developers enjoy a tremendous amount of
bargaining power. Often, they have a monopoly on software that is compatible to specific hardware
devices; upgrades and older versions of software must be compatible, etc. A consumer cannot easily
“shop around” between software developers to find software that is compatible with the consumer’s
hardware.
133. Guthman v. La Vida Llena, spelled out the requirements for an adhesion contract:
Three elements must be satisfied before an adhesion contract may be found. First, the
agreement must occur in the form of a standardized contract . . . . Second, the party
proffering the standardized contract must enjoy a superior bargaining position . . . .
Finally, the contract must be offered to the weaker party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
without opportunity for bargaining.
709 P.2d 675, 678 (N.M. 1985) (quoting Albuquerque Tire Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
697 P.2d 128, 131–32 (1985)); see also SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075,
1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“These courts have refused to recognize a bargain in shrinkwrap license that
is not signed by the party against whom it is enforced.” (citing Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v.
Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991), and Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d
255 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault II))).
134. This proposition is supported by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt.
d (1981):
But gross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to
the stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved elements of
deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice,
no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.
Id. See also Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing the
commentary on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS).
135. The author limits this assertion to shrinkwrap licenses commonly used in commercial
transactions. While broad, this category of licenses seeks to exclude situations wherein parties enter
into contracts with prior knowledge of the contract terms, prior experience with the other party, or
where both parties have in fact consummated the contract after some negotiation. For example,
where a party receives license materials under contract that he will later pay for the use of the
materials, the extra element is the promise to pay. See Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d
446 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the extra element of a promise to pay for the use of the work
distinguished the contract claim from a copyright claim). However, the author suggests that
shrinkwrap licenses commonly used in commercial transactions are presented only after the payment
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Nevertheless, Garry L. Founds argues that the element of bargain is
inherent in all contracts, and therefore “renders contract rights innately
different from copyright rights.”136 This logic invariably leads to the
conclusion that every contract claim would escape preemption. Several
courts have repudiated this assertion.137 Even ProCD stated, “Like the
Supreme Court in Wolens, we think it prudent to refrain from adopting a
rule that anything with the label ‘contract’ is necessarily outside the
preemption clause: the variations and possibilities are too numerous to
foresee.”138 The reason for this repudiation is clear: if no contract
involving the rights of § 106 could ever be subjected to federal
preemption, lawyers could dictate the application of copyright law
through shrinkwrap licenses.139 Copyright law cannot be deprived of the
power to preempt claims bearing the name “contract” that only regulate
the rights enumerated in § 106.140
Founds also suggests that the extra element of bargain is present in
shrinkwrap licenses because they are usually enforced as implied

is tendered, and the prospective licensee is unfamiliar with the terms of the license and unable to
negotiate any of these terms.
136. See Founds, supra note 49, at 107.
137. For example, in Wrench LLC, the court noted:
In finding that appellants’ state law contract claim is not preempted, we do not embrace
the proposition that all state law contract claims survive preemption simply because they
involve the additional element of promise. . . . If the promise amounts only to a promise
to refrain from reproducing, performing, distributing or displaying the work, then the
contract claim is preempted.
256 F.3d at 457; see, e.g., ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996); Rosciszewski
v. Arete Assocs., Inc, 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that a breach of contract claim was
preempted by copyright law because it did not contain an extra element that distinguished it from
copyright law); Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431–33
(8th Cir. 1993); see also Info. Handling Servs. v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (stating that a breach of contract claim based on a shrinkwrap license would be
preempted by copyright law because it contained no extra element); see generally Vault II, 847 F.2d
at 269 (finding that a provision in the Louisiana License Act prohibiting adaptation or decompilation
of a computer program was preempted by federal copyright law because it touched upon an area of
federal copyright law, the preemption of which in turn preempted the shrinkwrap license relying on
the Louisiana Act).
138. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
139. See Slawson, supra note 130, at 529.
140. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01(B)(1)(a)
at 1–22 (2003) (“Although the vast majority of contract claims will presumably survive scrutiny . . .
nonetheless pre-emption should continue to strike down claims that, though denominated ‘contract,’
nonetheless complain directly about the reproduction of expressive materials.”).
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agreements between the parties.141 However, as cited by Founds,
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 211(3) suggests that “[w]here
the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular
term, the term is not part of the agreement.”142 It is reasonable to believe
that prospective licensees would not enter into shrinkwrap licenses if
they understood that entering into such constituted a waiver of their
federal rights.143 Although Founds also states that there are “compelling
policy arguments for the necessity of adhesion contracts,” such policy
arguments deal only with the importance of simplification of the
procedure and cost associated with negotiated contracts.144 While this
policy is important to the purpose of “promot[ing] the Progress of
Science and [the] Arts,”145 Congress has nevertheless stated that
copyright law should dominate in the “vague borderline areas between
State and Federal protection.”146 A further discussion of the merits of
federal policy in this area follows below.147
The extra element of bargain is absent because contract claims based
on shrinkwrap licenses are unconscionable. While an analysis of
unconscionability may seem more appropriate in the context of state
contract law, it is appropriate in this discussion because the
determination of unconscionability ultimately bears on an interpretation
of federal copyright policy.148 Unconscionability requires a finding of

141. See Founds, supra note 49, at 107 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
section 211 to support the proposition that a party may manifest assent); see also supra notes 53–56
and accompanying text. The court in I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp., 183 F.
Supp. 2d 328, 337 (D. Mass. 2002), considered the issue of whether a clickwrap agreement was
enforceable. The court held that the clickwrap license was enforceable as an implied agreement
because of the previous relationship of the parties and similar contracts that they had formerly
entered into; thus, the later contract at issue was enforceable because it did not create an undue
hardship on the licensee nor materially change the terms of previously-entered-into contracts. This
finding of an implied agreement relies heavily on the previous contractual agreements between two
savvy companies. This case should not stand for the broad proposition that every shrinkwrap license
is enforceable; certainly, there are numerous cases in which unlearned and inexperienced consumers
are forced to forgo statutory rights. In such cases, a greater level of scrutiny is appropriate in
determining whether or not there is actual bargain.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
143. See infra notes 148–54 and accompanying text.
144. See Founds, supra note 49, at 107.
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
146. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 130 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746.
147. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
148. Slawson, supra note 130, observed:
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procedural and substantive unconscionability.149 Contract claims based
on shrinkwrap licenses are procedurally unconscionable as contracts of
adhesion;150 however, the aspect of substantive unconscionability is a
separate determination which requires state judges to interpret federal
issues. A judge must weigh the value of federal rights against state rights
arguably established through nonnegotiable “contracts” between parties
of extremely different bargaining power. Substantive unconscionability
is a federal issue masquerading as a state law issue because it involves
consideration of a contract’s reasonableness, commercial impact, and
other policy matters that are best answered by federal copyright law.151

There being no private consent to support a contract of adhesion, its legitimacy rests
entirely on its compliance with standards in the public interest. The individual who is
subject to the obligations imposed by a standard form thus gains the assurance that the
rules to which he is subject have received his consent either directly or through their
conforming to higher public laws and standards made and enforced by the public
institutions that legitimately govern him.
Id. at 566.
149. See Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Courts have
generally recognized that the doctrine of unconscionability involves both ‘procedural’ and
‘substantive’ elements.”). Procedural unconscionability involves a consideration of how the contract
is negotiated, inequality of bargaining power, and the way in which the terms are presented. See
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantive unconscionability
focuses on the effects beyond the contract itself. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003) (reciting the elements
considered in an unconscionability determination); see, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335
F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Substantive unconscionability concerns the ‘terms of the
agreement and whether those terms are so one-sided as to shock the conscience.’” (quoting Ingle v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003))) (citations omitted); Harris v. Green
Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Substantive unconscionability refers to
contractual terms that are unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored
party does not assent.”); Carlson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 296 n.12 (4th Cir. 1989)
(stating that “substantive unconscionability reminds us of contracts or clauses contrary to public
policy or illegal” (quoting 1 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-3 (3d ed.
1988))); Raasch v. NCR Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 847, 860 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (reasoning that
substantive unconscionability involves a determination of reasonableness and policy).
150. Because the nature of shrinkwrap licenses is the same as contracts of adhesion, such
licenses are procedurally unconscionable. See supra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of shrinkwrap
licenses as contracts of adhesion. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir 2002) (“A
contract is procedurally unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion, i.e., a standardized contract,
drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, that relegates to the subscribing party only the
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.”); Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 783 (finding that an
employment contract presented on a “take it or leave it” basis was procedurally unconscionable as a
contract of adhesion); Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 535
U.S. 1112 (2002); Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 382 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (“A finding of a contract of adhesion is essentially a finding of procedural
unconscionability.”).
151. See supra note 149. The author submits that the policy considerations inherent in
evaluating the substantive conscionability of shrinkwrap licenses are central to the policy
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The text and legislative history of § 301, as discussed above,152 suggest
that contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses are substantively
unconscionable because they seek to protect the same rights as copyright
law does. Additionally, federal law should preempt shrinkwrap license
provisions that seek to subdue the fair use rights granted to the public
under § 117 of the Copyright Act.153 Finally, contracts based on
shrinkwrap licenses are substantively unconscionable because these
would allow shrinkwrap license drafters to expand state law protections
beyond the limits already established by federal law.154 Therefore, the
extra element of bargain is not present where shrinkwrap licenses are
unconscionable.
The extra element of bargain appears illusory because it can be
viewed as tightly bound with almost any transaction between parties,
thus making it difficult to argue that it belongs solely to contract law. For
example, a copyright claim incorporates bargain. The copyright owner
agrees to disclose the copyrightable expression in order to further the
“Progress of Science and [the] Arts,”155 and in return, the government
bestows the valuable consideration of a copyright, which allows the
copyright owner to bring suit against alleged infringers;156 thus, this
transaction involves bargain. Such an interpretation is not unlike what
the courts have done in parsing legal lines in order to develop a so-called
extra element that distinguishes contract and shrinkwrap claims that
ultimately involve equivalent rights under § 106. While many of the
extra elements used by courts in the past have been significant,157 there
is no such significance when dealing with bargain. Because bargain is an
extra element that can be tenuously extracted from any transaction, it

considerations of federal copyright law, and a determination of substantive unconscionabilty must
take into consideration the policy underlying federal copyright law.
152. See supra Part III.A.2.
153. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of how shrinkwrap licenses conflict with the fair
use doctrine.
154. This argument suggests that by drafting shrinkwrap licenses, lawyers could thereby
engage in the lawmaking process. This concern was identified by W. David Slawson over thirty
years ago. See Slawson, supra note 130. Slawson argues in part that because standard form contracts
dominate society and involve terms that are not agreed upon, but rather imposed, lawyers are able to
engage in the lawmaking process. Id.
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2000) (“[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any
United States work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title.”).
157. See listing of cases supra note 87.
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appears nonsubstantive and arbitrary. Even in the context of copyright, it
is possible to argue that any user of a copyrighted work enters into an
implied agreement with the copyright owner not to infringe the § 106
rights. Clearly, it would not be proper to allow breach of contract claims
based on the bargain involved in these implied agreements. Furthermore,
as discussed in the following paragraph, where overlap between contract
and copyright law results in vagueness, copyright law should control.
Finally, the extra element of bargain is not proper because this
controversy lies in “vague borderline areas between State and Federal
protection” wherein Congress intended federal law to dominate.158 The
intent of Congress was to allow § 301 to be powerful in such areas. The
situation in Bowers was extremely sympathetic: Baystate reverse
engineered and began marketing Bowers’ software. This created intense
competition in the marketplace and forced Bowers to bundle the software
with another company’s (Cadkey) software, likely suffering
economically as a result. Shortly thereafter, Baystate took over Cadkey
and eliminated Bowers from the Cadkey network. However, this
Comment submits that even in vague borderline areas warranting
sympathy from the courts, Congress has indicated that federal law should
dominate.
For the foregoing reasons, courts should not rely on the extra
element of bargain to deny preemption of contract claims based on
shrinkwrap licenses. However, due to the threat that shrinkwrap licenses
also pose to the doctrine of fair use found in § 107 of the Copyright Act,
such licenses should be preempted by copyright law based on a conflict
preemption analysis.
B. Conflict Preemption is Proper Where Shrinkwrap
Licenses Threaten the Fair Use Doctrine
It has been argued that “[a] state is not free to eliminate the fair use
defense.”159 If copyright law cannot preempt breach of contract claims
based on shrinkwrap licenses, then fair use is vitiated. In other words,
because the fair use doctrine only provides exceptions to copyright
infringement, persons making a fair use of a copyrighted work would not
be insulated from breach of contract claims.160 Thus, allowing breach of

158. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 130 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746.
159. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1336 (Fed. Cir.) (Dyk, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003).
160. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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contract claims based on shrinkwrap licenses sets at naught the fair use
doctrine and the purposes of Congress.161 This result should be avoided
for two reasons. First, it is improper to not preempt shrinkwrap
agreements that are “far broader [in scope] than the protection afforded
by copyright law.”162 Second, the purposes and policy of copyright law
support preemption of shrinkwrap licenses.
1. Shrinkwrap licenses may eliminate fair use by protecting rights that
are broader than the rights protected under copyright law
Evisceration of fair use, accomplished when breach of contract
claims based on shrinkwrap licenses overcome corresponding federal
copyright claims, allows shrinkwrap licenses to create a form of
protection greater than that available under copyright or patent law.163
Without fair use, shrinkwrap licenses would cause copyright protection
to “extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”164 Thus, by
simply using shrinkwrap licenses on her software, a software developer
would be able to create protection for her ideas akin to patent protection
(much broader than copyright protection),165 and thereby create rights
that are equivalent to the separate rights protected under the Copyright
and Patent Acts.166 Because the creation of these rights is untenable and
even precluded under copyright and patent law,167 shrinkwrap licenses
must be preempted.

161. See the discussion of the purposes of Congress in enacting the Copyright Act and § 301
supra Part III.A.2.
162. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1326.
163. To be sure, computer software protection under the copyright law is notably distinct from
patent protection and protection under the DMCA. In order to obtain a patent for a computer
software program, the program must meet the elevated requirements of novelty, nonobviousness,
and originality. The patentee of a computer program could then successfully sue for unauthorized
use of her idea, process, or method of operation or equivalents thereof. Copyright protection is a
lesser form of protection than that of a patent. Copyright protection extends only to “original works
of authorship,” and a remedy under copyright law is only available when factual copying is proved,
as discussed above. See §§ 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act cited supra note 77.
164. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
165. For a brief description of the difference between copyright and patent protection, see
supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102.
167. Section 301(a), as discussed previously in this Comment, prohibits the creation of state
rights that are equivalent to the rights protected under the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
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2. Conflict preemption of shrinkwrap license terms that eviscerate the
fair use doctrine is proper
Conflict preemption is appropriate where state contract law, as
applied to shrinkwrap licenses, conflicts directly with the fair use
doctrine of § 107 of the Copyright Act. State law may be displaced under
a conflict preemption analysis168 when that state law “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”169 This form of preemption has also been
compared to preemption under the Supremacy Clause; that is, it is a form
of preemption “that goes beyond [§] 301 to discuss whether . . . state
law . . . is an ‘obstacle’ to the objectives of the Copyright Act.”170 This
section presents the conflict between § 107 of the Copyright Act and
state law, delineates some of the goals of copyright law, and shows how
the evisceration of the fair use doctrine by shrinkwrap license
contravenes these goals. Finally, this section submits that under the
conflict preemption analysis, contract claims based on shrinkwrap
contracts should be preempted by federal law in order to eliminate the
conflict with § 107 and thereby protect the fair use doctrine.
As an initial matter, the conflict preemption analysis, based in policy
considerations, is different from the preemption analysis under § 301.
While a § 301 analysis preempts state rights that are equivalent to federal
rights, conflict preemption weighs the effect of the state claim against the
underlying policy of the Copyright Act.171 Thus, conflict preemption
arises when a state law compromises the purposes and objectives of
Congress because “federal policy ‘may not be set at naught, or its
benefits denied’ by the state law.”172
Shrinkwrap license prohibitions often conflict with the fair use
doctrine in § 107 of the Copyright Act. As detailed above,173 the fair use
doctrine is important for educational institutions, libraries, and various

Additionally, the Patent Act prohibits the creation of patent-like rights unless obtained through a
valid patent. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102.
168. See supra note 72.
169. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
170. Founds, supra note 49, at 104 n.21 (quoting ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES AGE 812–13 (1997)).
171. Founds, supra note 49, at 104.
172. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (quoting Sola Elec. Co. v.
Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)).
173. See supra Part II.A.2.
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other individuals who use copyrighted works in areas such as teaching,
comment, criticism, and scholarship.174 Reverse engineering is a valid
fair use which encourages innovation and technological progress.175
However, where shrinkwrap license provisions prohibit the right to
access, copy, dissemble, decompile, or convert software for
noncommercial purposes,176 they conflict with federal law and an
analysis under conflict preemption is appropriate.
The purposes and goals of copyright law are apparent from case law
regarding the Copyright Act. The Supreme Court outlined the goals of
copyright law in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music:177 “[T]he goals of the
copyright law [are] ‘to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying
matter’”178 and “to promote science and the arts.”179 The Court added
that “the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works.”180 Critical to the goal
of progress, the Copyright Act provides the digital fair use exception to
copyright infringement that allows others to build on and benefit from
the work of others.181 Thus, shrinkwrap license provisions that nullify
these federally granted rights should be preempted by copyright law
under a conflict preemption analysis.
Shrinkwrap license restrictions on archival copying of copyrighted
materials conflict with § 107 because archival copying is a defensible
fair use. Under the fair use analysis, although archival copying is a direct
and complete copy of the copyrighted work, the effect on the market and
the purpose and character of use justify treating archival copying as a fair
use.182 Simply put, archival copying allows consumers to protect their
investment by creating personal copies that would be used only if the
original is destroyed. Thus, there is no effect on the original market.183

174. See supra notes 4, 22.
175. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
176. For an example of such a license, refer to the Vault license described in Part II.B.2.b.
177. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
178. Id. at 578 n.10 (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1105, 1134 (1990)).
179. Id. at 579.
180. Id.
181. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the doctrine of fair use
and its purposes.
182. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
183. It may be argued that archival copying does create some effect on the original market
because the replacement copies of the lost or destroyed software are never purchased. But if a
developer only licenses the software to the consumer, then the initial purchase of the software
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Backing up copyrighted works for archival storage and protection is not
sinister in character. It is merely a noncommercial use that insulates the
consumer. Restrictions on the fair use of archival copying found in
shrinkwrap licenses should therefore be preempted under conflict
preemption.
Shrinkwrap license restrictions on reverse engineering also conflict
with § 107. As mentioned above, reverse engineering has been identified
as a valid fair use.184 Restrictions on reverse engineering do not
“promote science and the arts” because these prohibitions stifle teaching,
criticism, research, and technological progress in general.185 The
importance of reverse engineering is embodied in the statement:
“Innovation is not a private act—it is seldom the product of a single
individual’s intellectual brilliance. Innovation is a product of the
connections between individuals and their ideas. . . . It is the constant
interplay of ideas, perspectives, experiences and values that spawns
innovation.”186 A restriction on reverse engineering through shrinkwrap
licenses slows innovation because it inhibits research and development
of new ideas and technologies.187 Shrinkwrap restrictions on the fair use
of reverse engineering found in shrinkwrap licenses should therefore be
preempted under conflict preemption.

accounts for a purchased license to use the software, and a replacement purchase would amount to
the purchase of a second license. Where a license has already been properly acquired, it may seem
unfair to require the purchase of duplicative licenses when the original software is lost or destroyed.
184. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
185. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. It is also possible to argue that restricting reverse engineering
promotes the science and the arts. This argument suggests that a developer would therefore be able
capitalize on her own work instead of losing profits to competitors who develop takeoffs. While this
is facially convincing, it fails to consider that courts are willing to hold alleged infringers liable
where the accused article is a rough equivalent of the copyrighted work. See supra note 62 and
accompanying text. This reality should change the way reverse engineering is viewed; reverse
engineering should be considered an altruistic activity that is educational and scholarly. Regardless,
unscrupulous competitors who use reverse engineering to create rough equivalents will likely be
held liable for the same. This reasoning is supported by the policy for allowing reverse engineering
propounded in Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10. See supra note 178 and
accompanying text.
186. GARY HAMEL, LEADING THE REVOLUTION 280 (2000).
187. While one may argue that the reverse engineering of computer software cannot be a fair
use because it may ultimately have a commercial goal (eventual creation of a competing product),
such circumstances are contemplated by the purposes of copyright law. As stated in Campbell, the
goals of copyright are furthered by the creation of transformative works. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
Furthermore, the monopoly created by copyright law serves to entice software developers to develop
new and improved technologies, and such technological progression must necessarily follow a
predecessor.
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Shrinkwrap license restrictions on converting or translating software
also contradict § 107 of the Copyright Act. These restrictions frustrate
the purposes of copyright law because they create artificial barriers to
information and may result in perpetual monopolies over nonprotectable
information thereby suffocating innovation.188 Typically, a software
program is designed to be interoperable with only a few other programs.
Under the terms of a shrinkwrap license, however, users are forbidden
from adapting these programs to suit their needs.189 This restriction
creates a barrier on the fair use doctrine that would otherwise protect
consumers’ right to noncommercial adaptation of computer software.190
Congress was careful to avoid such a restriction when drafting the
DMCA. Although the DMCA forbids “accessing” a computer program,
it carves out an exception for activities that are necessary to achieve
interoperability with other programs (which is a fair use).191 This
example should serve as an archetype when courts consider the validity
of shrinkwrap restrictions on fair uses. Ultimately, shrinkwrap license
restrictions on the fair uses of converting or translating software for
noncommercial purposes should be preempted under conflict
preemption.
Several courts have already used the conflict preemption analysis to
allow copyright law to preempt state claims. In Associated Film
Distribution Corp. v. Thornburg,192 the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that a claim based on
Pennsylvania law was preempted by federal copyright law, because
where the two are in conflict, “the Supremacy Clause [i.e., federal law] is
decisive.”193 Additionally, the rationale in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software

188. Some may argue that in the world of computer software a copyright is “perpetual”
because the software protected thereunder would likely become obsolete prior to the end of the term
of the copyright. While this might be true in some cases, the monopoly authorized by the
Constitution is certainly not “limited” when uncopyrightable material is protected by a shrinkwrap
license. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
189. For an example of such a license, refer to the Vault license described supra in Part
II.B.2.b.
190. Along these same lines, the court in Vault found that the Louisiana License Act was
preempted by federal law because it allowed software developers to prohibit adaptation and
decompilation of computer programs in direct conflict with § 117 of the Copyright Act. See Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988) (Vault II).
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2000).
192. 520 F. Supp. 971, 993 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 683 F.2d
808 (3d Cir. 1982).
193. Id.
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Ltd.194 suggests that the court based its decision, at least in part, on
conflict preemption. The Fifth Circuit found that because the Louisiana
License Act “‘touched upon the area’ of federal copyright law, its
provisions were preempted and Vault’s license agreement was
unenforceable.”195
In summary, conflict preemption is appropriate where contract
claims based on shrinkwrap licenses conflict with the fair use doctrine of
§ 107 of the Copyright Act. Finding to the contrary would allow state
contract law to subdue the fair use doctrine, contravening important
policy considerations supporting fair use. Furthermore, as the next part
demonstrates, shrinkwrap licenses are becoming increasingly
unnecessary due to the sharp judicial awareness of the peculiarities of the
software industry, the collective desire to protect developer interests, and
the ability to do so with effective tools.
IV. SHRINKING NEED FOR SHRINKWRAPS: COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE
DMCA, TEMPERED BY THE TRADITIONAL FAIR USE ANALYSIS,
PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC AND OF
SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS
The power of the Copyright Act makes shrinkwrap licenses
unnecessary. An application of copyright law, tempered by the doctrine
of fair use, can protect the interests of software developers without
creating conflicts with federal law. For example, in a world without
shrinkwrap licenses, where a party purchases software and later makes
unauthorized commercial use of it, copyright law would ensure a fair
solution. The accused infringer may assert a digital fair use defense, but a
court would likely dismiss the fair use defense due to the commercial
nature of the use and its effect on the product’s market. Of course, in
other situations where a fair use exists, a court will properly find against
infringement. These equitable results can be achieved without relying on
shrinkwrap licenses that subdue the fair use doctrine of § 107. Therefore,
through an application of copyright law and the digital fair use doctrine,
courts can protect the economic interests of computer developers.196

194. Vault II, 847 F.2d at 269.
195. Id. (quoting Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 763 (E.D. La. 1987)
(Vault I)).
196. This assertion is founded in an economic, rather than a moral-based, rationale. See supra
note 14. Although it has been suggested that copyright law is now applied with a moralistic
approach, O’Rourke, supra note 14, at 483 & n.15, the practical economic effect of the author’s
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The four prongs of the fair use analysis require the court to consider
(1) the commercial nature, character, and purpose of the use; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
copyrighted work that was used; and (4) “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”197
The first prong requires a court to analyze “the purpose and character
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes.”198 In Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music,199
the Court noted that this prong first determines whether the use is for
criticism, teaching, comment, news reporting, or other uses found in §
107; the purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether or not the use is
transformative.200 In Campbell, the Court reversed a finding of
infringement because 2 Live Crew’s use of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty
Woman” was sufficiently transformative and would therefore not affect
the original market.201 When applying the first prong to the computer
software market, a court would likely find any use that interferes with the
commercial interests of a computer developer weighs against a finding of
fair use. However, consumers’ free use of copyrighted materials for
limited personal, noncommercial purposes, such as archival copying,
would not likely violate this prong. Judicial adherence to the traditional
fair use analysis will ensure that infringing software users will be
punished and that the public’s right to make fair use of copyrighted
digital materials will be protected.
The second and fourth prongs of the fair use analysis require the
court to consider “the nature of the copyrighted work”202 and “the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.”203 In considering the effect of the use on the market, a court
determines whether the allegedly infringing work is a “substitute for the
original [that] usurp[s] a market that properly belongs to the copyright

assertion that copyright law adequately protects the economic interests of computer developers must
be considered.
197. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
198. Id. § 107(1).
199. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
200. Id. at 578–79.
201. Id. at 594. The court reasoned that the parodic rap song produced by 2 Live Crew
targeted a different market than the original version of the song. Therefore, there would be no
commercial effect of 2 Live Crew’s use on the original market of Roy Orbison’s song.
202. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
203. Id. § 107(4).
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holder.”204 These prongs allow the courts to consider the special nature
of computer software—that any unauthorized commercial use may
significantly impair the value of the software for the computer
developer.205 Considering this, courts may hold allegedly infringing
activities to a higher level of scrutiny. Courts may accomplish this by
increasing the burden of proof of innocence placed on the accused
infringer.
Finally, courts carefully weigh “the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,”206
understanding that even minimal use of the heart of a computer software
program can harm the software developer. It is not requisite to prove
exact copying; a court may use its latitude to show legal copying, i.e.,
substantial similarity.207 Under this prong, courts have long been able to
penalize unscrupulous competitors when “substantial similarity” and
“proof of access” can be shown.208
In the end, shrinkwrap licenses are unnecessary because the
Copyright Act creates a refuge that is robust enough to protect the
interests of software developers, and circumspect enough to preserve the
fair use doctrine. Copyright law has not lost its power to punish those
who offend the policies of the Copyright Act. Where unscrupulous
competitors raise the fair use defense to a claim of infringement, courts
can consider the entire landscape of the case and make appropriate
decisions. By applying the traditional fair use analysis, courts are capable of
protecting the interests of the public and of software developers.209
204. Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Infinity
Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 1998)).
205. “Commercial use” in this context refers to a use that may affect the value of the software,
whether or not the user profits from the commercial use. It is clear that sales of unauthorized copies
will directly affect the market of the original work. However, a commercial use would also include
instances where software is simply made available to others for pirating. Pirating invariably has an
effect on the market because it steals away prospective purchasers.
206. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
207. Actual copying is shown where the defendant has copied portions of the copyrighted
work verbatim. Legal copying is proven on a sliding scale: the plaintiff must show that the
defendant’s work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work and that the defendant had access
to the copyrighted work.
208. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169–70 (7th Cir. 1997);
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Even in the
absence of verbatim copying, a copyright owner may show infringement ‘by showing that the
infringer had access to the work and that the two works are substantially similar.’” (quoting Shaw v.
Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990))).
209. It is possible to argue that the interests of software developers are not served because
without shrinkwrap licenses the burden on software developers would increase because causes of
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V. CONCLUSION
Copyright law should preempt breach of contract claims based on
shrinkwrap licenses for several reasons. First, preemption is proper under §
301 of the Copyright Act. Courts that have refused preemption under § 301
by applying the extra element test have improperly based their decision on
the extra element of bargain—an element that is not present in shrinkwrap
licenses because there is no other option to the consumer but to accept the
license or return the software to the developer.
Second, preemption is necessary in order to preserve the digital fair use
doctrine from evisceration. This doctrine should not be nullified by
shrinkwrap licenses because it serves the underlying policies of copyright
law, “to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter”210 and “to
promote science and the arts.”211 Evisceration of the fair use is problematic
because it allows shrinkwrap licenses to create a form of protection greater
than that available under copyright or patent law. By weighing the practical
effects of the shrinkwrap licensing provisions against the purposes of
copyright law, courts should be moved to invalidate such provisions.
Finally, preemption of shrinkwrap licenses is proper because it still
allows protection of software developers. Copyright law, tempered by the
doctrine of fair use, makes shrinkwrap licenses unnecessary by sufficiently
protecting the interests of software developers and the public.
Nathan Smith

action in copyright tempered by a four-pronged fair use test would be more expensive to litigate than
causes of action based in contract. The author first notes that no comprehensive studies have been
produced regarding this concern. Second, while this is a valid concern, it depends greatly on the
facts of each individual case. Generally, a breach of contract claim and a copyright claim will both
require the plaintiff to prove several elements; in turn, the burden of proving defenses to both claims
rests squarely on the accused. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that a copyright claim would be any
more expensive to litigate than a breach of contract claim.
210. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (quoting Leval, supra
note 178, at 1134).
211. Id. at 579.
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